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Abstract
Physical superpositions exist both in classical and in quantum physics.
However, what is exactly meant by ‘superposition’ in each case is
extremely different. In this paper we discuss some of the multiple
interpretations which exist in the literature regarding superpositions
in quantum mechanics. We argue that all these interpretations have
something in common: they all attempt to avoid ‘contradiction’. We
argue in this paper, in favor of the importance of developing a new
interpretation of superpositions which takes into account contradic-
tion, as a key element of the formal structure of the theory, “right
from the start”. In order to show the feasibility of our interpretational
project we present an outline of a paraconsistent approach to quantum
superpositions which attempts to account for the contradictory proper-
ties present in general within quantum superpositions. This approach
must not be understood as a closed formal and conceptual scheme but
rather as a first step towards a different type of understanding regard-
ing quantum superpositions.
Keywords: quantum superposition, para-consistent logic, interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics.
PACS numbers: 02.10 De
1 Introduction
There is an important link in the history of physics between the interpre-
tation of theories and their formal development. Relativity would have not
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been possible without non-euclidean geometry nor classical physics with-
out infinitesimal calculus. In quantum mechanics, the formal scheme was
elaborated —mainly by Schro¨dingier, Heisenberg, Born, Jordan and Dirac—
almost in parallel to the orthodox interpretation. However, still today, the
interpretation of quantummechanics remains controversial regarding most of
its non-classical characteristics: indeterminism, holism, contextuality, non-
locality, etc. There is, still today, no consensus regarding the meaning of
such expressions of the theory. In this paper we shall be concerned with a
specific aspect of quantum mechanics, namely, the principle of superposition
which, as it is well known, gives rise to the so called quantum superposi-
tions. Physical superpositions exist both in classical and in quantum physics.
However, what is exactly meant by “superposition” in each case is extremely
different. In classical physics one can have superpositions of waves or fields.
A wave (field) α can be added to a different wave (field) β and the sum will
give a ‘new’ wave (field) µ = α + β. There is in this case no weirdness for
the sum of multiple states gives as a result a new single state. In quantum
mechanics on the contrary, a linear combination of multiple states, α+ β is
not reducible to one single state, and there is no obvious interpretation of
such superposition of states. As a matter of fact, today quantum superposi-
tions play a central role within the most outstanding technical developments
such as quantum teleportation, quantum cryptography and quantum com-
putation [21, 26]. The question we attempt to address in this paper regards
the meaning and physical representation of quantum superpositions. There
are many interpretations of quantum mechanics each of which provides an
answer to this question. In the following we shall review some of these pro-
posals. We shall then argue in favor of the possibility to develop a new
interpretation which considers contradictory properties as a main aspect of
quantum superpositions and present an outline of a formal approach based
on paraconsistent logic which attempts to consider contradiction “right from
the start”. We must remark that we do not understand this approach as
a closed formal and conceptual scheme but rather as a first step towards a
different type of understanding regarding quantum superpositions.
Paraconsistent logics are the logics of inconsistent but nontrivial theories.
The origins of paraconsistent logics go back to the first systematic studies
dealing with the possibility of rejecting the principle of noncontradiction.
Paraconsistent logic was elaborated, independently, by Stanislaw Jaskowski
in Poland, and by the first author of this paper in Brazil, around the middle
of the last century (on paraconsistent logic, see, for example: [5]). A theory
T founded on the logic L, which contains a symbol for negation, is called
2
inconsistent if it has among its theorems a sentence A and its negation ¬A;
otherwise, it is said to be consistent. T is called trivial if any sentence of
its language is also a theorem of T ; otherwise, T is said to be non-trivial.
In classical logics and in most usual logics, a theory is inconsistent if, and
only if, it is trivial. L is paraconsistent when it can be the underlying logic
of inconsistent but non trivial theories. Clearly classical logic and all usual
logics are not paraconsistent. The importance of paraconsistent logic is not
limited to the realm of pure logic but has been extended to many fields
of application such as robot control, air traffic control [24], control systems
for autonomous machines [25], defeasible deontic reasoning [23], information
systems [1] and medicine.
In the following, we attempt to call the attention to the importance of
extending the realm of paraconsistent logic to the formal account of quantum
superpositions. Firstly, we shall discuss the very different meanings of the
term ‘superposition’ in both classical and quantum physics. In section 3, we
shall present some of the very different interpretations of the meaning of a
quantum superposition which can be found in the literature. In section 4,
we shall argue in favor of the importance of considering an interpretation
of superposition in terms of paraconsistent logic. In section 5, we present a
formal scheme in terms of paraconsistent logic which attempts to account for
the inner contradictions present within a quantum superposition. Finally,
in section 6, we argue in favor of considering contradiction “right from the
start”.
2 What is a Quantum Superposition?
In classical physics, every physical system may be described exclusively by
means of its actual properties, taking ‘actuality’ as expressing the preexistent
mode of being of the properties themselves, independently of observation —
the ‘pre’ referring to its existence previous to measurement. Each system
has a determined state characterized mathematically in terms of a point in
phase space. The change of the system may be described by the change of
its actual properties. Potential or possible properties are considered as the
points to which the system might arrive in a future instant of time. The
occurrence of possibilities in such cases merely reflects our ignorance about
what is actual. Contrary to what seems to happen in quantum mechanics,
statistical states do not correspond to features of the actual system, but
quantify our lack of knowledge of those actual features ([9], p. 125).
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Classical mechanics tells us via the equation of motion how the state of
the system moves along the curve determined by initial conditions in the
phase space. The representation of the state of the physical system is given
by a point in phase space Γ and the physical magnitudes are represented
by real functions over Γ. These functions commute between each other and
can be interpreted as possessing definite values independently of physical
observation, i.e. each magnitude can be interpreted as being actually preex-
istent to any possible measurement. In the orthodox formulation of quantum
mechanics, the representation of the state of a system is given by a ray in
Hilbert space H. But, contrary to the classical scheme, physical magnitudes
are represented by operators on H that, in general, do not commute. This
mathematical fact has extremely problematic interpretational consequences
for it is then difficult to affirm that these quantum magnitudes are simul-
taneously preexistent. In order to restrict the discourse to different sets of
commuting magnitudes, different Complete Sets of Commuting Operators
(CSCO) have to be chosen. The choice of a particular representation (given
by a CSCO) determines the basis in which the observables diagonalize and
in which the ray can be expressed. Thus, the ray can be written as different














The linear combinations of states are also called quantum superpositions.
As it was clearly expressed by Dirac [6]: “The nature of the relationships
which the superposition principle requires to exist between the states of any
system is of a kind that cannot be explained in terms of familiar physical
concepts. One cannot in the classical sense picture a system being partly
in each of two states and see the equivalence of this to the system being
completely in some other state.” The formal difference of using vectors in H
instead of points in Γ seems to imply that in quantum mechanics —apart
from the ‘possibility’ which is encountered in classical mechanics— there is
another, different realm which must be necessarily considered and refers,
at each instant of time, to contradictory properties. To see this, consider
the following example: given a spin 1/2 system whose state is | ↑z>, we
let it interact with a magnetic field in the z direction. All outcomes that
can become actual in the future are potential properties of the system, in
an analogous manner as all possible reachable positions of a pendulum are
in the classical case. But at each instant of time, for example at the initial
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instant, if we consider the z direction and the projection operator | ↑z><↑z |
as representing a preexistent actual property, there are other incompatible
properties arising from considering projection operators of spin projections
in other directions. For example, in the x direction, the projection operators
| ↑x><↑x | and | ↓x><↓x | do not commute with | ↑z><↑z | and thus,
cannot be considered to possess definite values simultaneously. Since Born
interpretation of the wave function, these properties are usually considered
as possible. However, this possibility is essentially different from the idea
of possibility discussed in classical physics which relates to the idea of a
process. If we consider that the formalism of quantum mechanics provides
a description of the world, a representation of what there is —and does not
merely make reference to measurement outcomes—, at each instant of time
the properties, | ↑z><↑z |, | ↑x><↑x | and | ↓x><↓x | must be taken into
account independently of their future actualization for they all provide non
trivial information about the state of affairs. In particular, the properties
| ↑x><↑x | and | ↓x><↓x |, which constitute the superposition and must be
considered simultaneously are in general contradictory properties.
In the quantum logic approach one of the properties, namely, the one
in which we can write the state of affairs as a single term, is considered
as ‘actual’ while the others are taken to be ‘potential’ properties. Potential
properties can become actual. These properties, e.g. | ↑x><↑x |, | ↓x><↓x |,
| ↑y><↑y | and | ↓y><↓y | in our example, are always part of superpositions
with more than one term and are constituted by contradictory properties.
However, from a mathematical perspective, independently of their mode of
existence, both potential and actual properties are placed at the same level
in the algebraic frame which describes the state of affairs according to quan-
tum mechanics: the projections of the spin in all directions are atoms of the
lattice and there is no formal priority of the actual over the potential prop-
erties. This rises the question if one can consider quantum superpositions
as preexistent entities, independently of their future actualization.
In the laboratory, it is precisely this contradictory potential realm which
is necessary to be considered by the experimentalist in the developments
which are taking place today regarding the processing of quantum infor-
mation as quantum computing and quantum communication [21, 26]. This
seems to point in the direction that these properties have an existence which
cannot be reduced to their becoming actual at a future instant of time. Super-
positions correspond to possible outcomes which occur on an equal footing
in the superposition of the final state, so that there is no sign that any one
of them is more real than any other ([9], p. 120). Taking these problems
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into account there are many interpretations which attempt to provide an
answer to the question: what is a quantum superposition? We shall discuss
in the next section some of these proposals.
3 The Multiple Interpretations of Quantum Su-
perpositions
As we have seen above, the formal description of quantum mechanics seems
to imply a deep departure from the classical notion of possible or proba-
ble. This was cleverly exemplified by Erwin Schro¨dinger in his famous cat
experiment [31], in which a half dead and half alive cat seemed to laugh
of the idea of possessing a determined state. However, one can find in the
literature, there are many different interpretations of quantum mechanics
in general and of the meaning of a quantum superposition in particular. In
this section we shall review some of these very distinct interpretations. We
do not attempt to provide a complete review of interpretations but rather
to analyze instead their specific understanding of quantum superpositions.
Although we must take into account the fact that ’state vector’ and ’cat’
are two concepts in different levels of discourse ([8], p. 189). From a re-
alist perspective, which considers physics as providing a description or an
expression of the world, the question still arises, if this formal or mathemat-
ical representation given by superpositions, namely equation 1 —which al-
low us to calculate the probability of the possible measurement outcomes—,
can be related conceptually to a notion which can allow us to think, in-
dependently of measurement outcomes, about the ‘superposition of states
in Hilbert space’ in an analogous manner as we think of a ‘point in phase
space’ (in the formal level) as describing an ‘object in space-time’ (in the
conceptual level). What is describing a mathematical superposition? Can
we create or find adequate concepts which can provide a representational
realistic account of a quantum superposition independent of measurement
outcomes? Of course, from a general empiricist perspective one is not com-
mitted to answering these set of questions. The idea that the quantum wave
function as related to a superposition is just a theoretical device with no on-
tological content goes back to Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The impossibility to interpret the quantum wave function in an ontological
fashion can be understood in relation to his characterization of Ψ in terms of
an algorithmic device which computes measurement results.1 This position
1According to Bohr ([36], p. 338) the Schro¨dinger wave equation is just an abstract
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radically addressed seems to end up in the instrumentalistic account shared
implicitly by many and developed explicitly by Fuchs and Peres [17]. Bas
van Fraassen, whom we consider a close follower of Bohr’s ideas, has also
taken an anti-metaphysical position with respect to the interpretation of the
quantum wave function. His justification stands on his empiricist account
of both physics and philosophy (see [34], section 9.1).
From an empiricist perspective the formalism does not provide a descrip-
tion of what there is. Superpositions are thus, a theoretical device through
which one can consider the actual observation hic et nunc. Empiricism can
be linked to probability in terms of the frequency interpretation which rests,
contrary to the original conception of probability, not on the idea that prob-
ability describes in terms of ignorance an existent state of affairs, but rather
in a set of empirical results found in a series of measurements. However, and
independently of the problems encountered within such empiricist stances, if
superpositions are considered just as a theoretical device, then the question
of interpretation seems to loose its strength. For why should we pursue an
interpretation if, like Fuchs and Peres remark, quantum mechanics does the
job and already provides an algorithm for computing probabilities for the
macroscopic events? There are other reasons which one could put forward
to account for the importance of interpretation even from an empiricist per-
spective (see for example van Fraassen [33]), however these reasons must
remain only secondary in the quest of science.
On the contrary, from a realist position, there is need to provide an
answer to the link between the theory and its conceptual understanding
of the world. To put it in a nutshell: what is quantum mechanics telling
us about the world? As noticed by Bacciagaluppi ([2], p. 74), the hidden
variable program attempts to “restore a classical way of thinking about what
there is.” In this sense, Bohm’s proposal seems to restore the possibility of
discussing in terms of a state of affairs described in terms of a set of definite
valued properties. In Bohmian mechanics the state of a system is given by
the wave function Ψ together with the configuration of particles X. The
quantum wave function must be understood in analogy to a classical field
that moves the particles in accordance with the following functional relation:
dx
dt
= ∇S, where S = ~δ (δ being the phase of ψ). Thus, particles always
have a well defined position together with the rest of their properties and
the evolution depends on the quantum field. It then follows that, there are
method of calculus and it does not designate in itself any phenomena. See also [3] for
discussion.
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no superpositions of states, the superposition is given only at the level of
the field and remains as mysterious as the superposition of classical fields.
The field does not only have a dynamical character but also determines the
epistemic probability of the configuration of particles via the usual Born
rule.
A different approach, which starts from a particular interpretation of
quantum superpositions is the so called many worlds interpretation (MW),
considered to be a direct conclusion from Everett’s first proposal in terms
of ‘relative states’ [12]. Everett’s idea was to let quantum mechanics find its
own interpretation, making justice to the symmetries inherent in the Hilbert
space formalism in a simple and convincing way [7]. MW interpretations are
no-collapse interpretations which respect the orthodox formulation of quan-
tum mechanics. The main idea behind many worlds interpretations is that
superpositions relate to collections of worlds, in each of which exactly one
value of an observable, which corresponds to one of the terms in the super-
position, is realized. Apart from being simple, the claim is that it possesses
a natural fit to the formalism, respecting its symmetries. The solution pro-
posed to the measurement problem is provided by assuming that each one
of the terms in the superposition is actual in its own correspondent world.
Thus, it is not only the single value which we see in ‘our world’ which gets
actualized but rather, that a branching of worlds takes place in every mea-
surement, giving rise to a multiplicity of worlds with their corresponding
actual values. The possible splits of the worlds are determined by the laws
of quantum mechanics but each world becomes again ‘classical’. Quantum
superpositions are interpreted as expressing the existence of multiple worlds,
each of which exists in (its own) actuality. However, there are no superpo-
sitions in this, our actual world, for each world becomes again a “classical
world”. The many worlds interpretation seems to be able to recover these
islands of classicality at the price of multiplying the ‘actual realm’. In this
case, the quantum superposition is expelled from each actual world and
recovered only in terms of the relation between the multiple worlds.
The Geneva school to quantum logic and similar approaches such as that
of Foulis and Randall [16] attempt to consider quantum physics as related
to the realms of actuality and potentiality in analogous manner to classical
physics. According to the Geneva school, both in classical and quantum
physics measurements will provoke fundamental changes of the state of the
system.2 Continuing Heisenberg’s considerations in the new physics, Con-
2What is special for a classical system, is that ‘observables’ can be described by func-
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stantin Piron has been one of the leading figures in developing the notion
of potentiality within the logical structure of quantum mechanics [27, 28].
Following [32], a physical property, never mind whether a classical or quan-
tum one, is specified as what corresponds to a set of definite experimental
projects. A definite experimental project (DEP) is an experimental proce-
dure (in fact, an equivalence class of experimental procedures) consisting
in a list of actions and a rule that specifies in advance what has to be
considered as a positive result, in correspondence with the yes answer to a
dichotomic question. Each DEP tests a property. A given DEP is called
certain (correspondingly, a dichotomic question is called true) if it is sure
that the positive response would be obtained when the experiment is per-
formed or, more precisely, in case that whenever the system is placed in
a measurement situation then it produces certain definite phenomenon to
happen. A physical property is called actual in case the DEPs which test it
are certain and it is called potential otherwise. Whether a property is actual
or potential depends on the state in which one considers the system to be.
Though in this approach both actuality and potentiality are considered as
modes of being, actual properties are considered as attributes that exist, in
the EPR sense as elements of physical reality3, while potential properties are
not conceived as existing in the same way as real ones. They are thought as
possibilities with respect to actualization, because potential properties may
be actualized due to some change in the state of the system. In this case the
superposition provides a measure —given by the real numbers which appear
in the same term as the state— over the potential properties which could
become actual in a given situation.
tions on the state space. This is the main reason that, a measurement corresponding to
such an observable, can be left out of the description of the theory ‘in case one is not
interested in the change of state provoked by the measurement’, but ‘only interested in
the values of the observables’. It is in this respect that the situation is very different for
a quantum system. Observables can also be described, as projection valued measures on
the Hilbert space, but ‘no definite values can be attributed to such a specific observable
for a substantial part of the states of the system’. For a quantum system, contrary to a
classical system, it is not true that ‘either a property or its negation is actual’.
3Einstein designed, in the by now famous EPR ‘paper’ [11], a definition of when a phys-
ical quantity could be considered an element of physical reality within quantum mechanics.
By using this definition Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen argued against the completeness of
the quantum theory. For a general discussion see [15].
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4 Quantum Superpositions and the ‘Contradiction’
of Properties?
Although the interpretations we have discussed in the previous section from
both their formal and metaphysical commitments have many differences,
there is still something they all share in common: they all attempt to avoid
contradictions. Indeed ‘contradiction’ has been regarded with disbelief in
Western thought due to certain metaphysical presuppositions which go back
to Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant. Even after the development of para-
consistent logic in the mid XX century and the subsequent technical progress
this theory has allowed, the aversion towards contradiction is still present
today within science and philosophy. The famous statement of Popper that
the acceptance of inconsistency “would mean the complete breakdown of sci-
ence” remains an unfortunate prejudice within present philosophy of science
(see [4], Chap. 5).
Leaving instrumentalist positions aside, one of us has argued elsewhere
[29] that one can find in the vast literature regarding the interpretation of
quantum mechanics, two main strategies which attempt to provide an an-
swer to the riddle of ‘what is quantum mechanics talking about’. The first
strategy is to begin with a presupposed set of metaphysical principles and
advance towards a new formalism. Examples of this strategy are Bohmian
mechanics, which has been discussed above, and the collapse theory pro-
posed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (also called ‘GRW theory’) [18], which
introduces non-linear terms in the Schro¨dinger equation. The second strat-
egy is to accept the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics and advance
towards the creation and elucidation of the metaphysical principles which
would allow us to answer the question: ‘what is quantum mechanics talking
about’? Examples of this second strategy are quantum logic and its different
lines of development such as the just described Geneva School of Jauch and
Piron, and the modal interpretation (see for example [10, 30, 35]). From
this perspective, the importance is to focus in the formalism of the theory
and try to learn about the symmetries, the logical features and structural
relations. The idea is that, by learning about such aspects of the theory
we can also develop the metaphysical conditions which should be taken into
account in a coherent ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics.
But even independently of the choice of this strategy, it seems quite clear
that technical developments which are taking place today regarding quan-
tum mechanics have advanced quite independently of the commitments to
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any classical metaphysical background. Quantum computation makes use
of the multiple flow of information in the superposition even considering (in
principle) contradictory paths. Also quantum cryptography uses the rela-
tion between contradictory terms in order to send messages avoiding classical
spies. At a formal level, the path integral approach takes into account the
multiple contradictory paths within two points [14]. Thus, since both the
formalism and experiments seem to consider ‘contradictory elements’ within
quantum mechanics, we argue that it can be of deep interest to advance to-
wards a formalism which takes contradiction into account “right from the
start”.4 Evidently, such a formalism could open paths not only to con-
tinue the technical developments just mentioned but also to understand the
meaning of quantum superpositions from a new perspective. Our proposal
is twofold, firstly, to call the attention of the importance of considering con-
tradictory properties within the formalism and interpretation of quantum
superpositions; and secondly, to show that paraconsistent logics can open
a formal line of research. In the next section we make a first step in this
same direction, providing an outline to an approach based on paraconsistent
logic.
5 An Outline of a Paraconsistent Approach to Quan-
tum Superpositions
We bring into, now, a paraconsistent logical system ZF1, that is a strong set
theory, even stronger than common ZF (Zermelo Frenkel set theory). On
ZF1 and related matters, see [5]. In what follows, we employ the terminol-
ogy, notations and conventions of Kleene [19]
The basic symbols of the langugae ZF1 are the following: 1) Proposi-
tional connectives: implication (→), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨) and
(weak) negation (¬), equivalence (↔) is defined as usual. 2) Individual vari-
ables: a demmuerable set of variables, that are represented by smal Latin
letters of the end of the aplphabet. 3) The quantifiers ∀ (for all) and ∃ (there
exists). 4) The binary predicate symbols ∈ (membership) and = (identity).
5) Auxiliary symbols: parenthesis.
Syntactic notions, for example those of formula, closed formula or sen-
tence, and free occurrence of a variable in a formula, are defined as custom-
ary. Russell’s symbol for description (ι) is introduced by contextual defi-
4In an analogous fashion as De´cio Krause has developed a Q-set theory which accounts
for indistinguishable particles with a formal calculus “right from the start” [20].
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nition and with the help of the description, the classifier {x;F (x)}, where
F (x) is a formula and x a variable.
Definition 5.1 A◦ abbreviates ¬(A ∧ ¬A).
Loosely speaking, A◦ means that A is a well-behaved formula, i.e., that
it is not the case that one has A and ¬A both true (or, what is the same
thing, that the contradiction A ∧ ¬A is false).
Definition 5.2 ¬∗A abbreviates ¬A ∧A◦.
¬∗ functions like a strong negation, a kind of classical negation in our
logic. On the other hand, ¬ is the weak (or paraconsistent) negation.
Postulates of ZF1
a) Propositional postulates:
1. A→ (B → A)
2. (A→ B)→ (A→ (B → C))→ (A→ C)
3. A A→B
B
4. (A ∧B)→ A
5. (A ∧B)→ B
6. A→ (B → (A ∧B))
7. A→ (A ∨B)
8. B → (A ∨B)
9. (A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ ((A ∨B)→ C))
10. A ∨ ¬A
11. ¬¬A→ A
12. B◦ → ((A→ B)→ ((A→ ¬B)→ ¬A))
13. (A◦ ∧B◦)→ (A→ B)◦
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14. (A◦ ∧B◦)→ (A ∧B)◦








5. ∀x(A(x))◦ → (∀xA(x))◦
6. ∀x(A(x))◦ → (∃xA(x))◦
The preceding postulates are subject to the usual restrictions. In clas-
sical logic, as well as in most usual logics, we are allowed to reletter
bind variables and suppress vacuous variables, but it seems that this is
not probable in connection with our system. Therefore, we introduce
the postulate:
7. If B is a formula obtained from A by relettering bound variables or by
the suppression of void quantifiers, then A↔ B is an axiom.
Remark. Postulates 1-15 constitute a propositional system of paraconsis-
tent logic and adding the quantificational postulates we obtain a first-order
quantificational paraconsistent logic.
c) Set-Theoretic Postulates:
They are all those of classical ZF in whose formulations the symbol of
negation is replaced by the symbol of strong negation ¬∗. The postulates
can be formulated supposing that ZF1 is a pure set theory or a theory that
contains Urelemente (objects that are not sets). Our results don’t depend
on the version employed of ZF1. Moreover the existence of some sets that
cause problems (do not exist) in ZF , like Russell’s collection, could be pos-
tulated as existing in ZF1; however, this possibility is here excluded. (ZF
is studied, for instance, in [22]).
From now on, capital letters stand for formulas. We have (see [5]):
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Definition 5.3 ⊢ A stands for A is a theorem of ZF1; 0 A is the negation
of ⊢ A.
Definition 5.4 A∗ is the formula obtained from A by replacing any occur-
rence of ¬ by an occurrence of ¬∗.
Theorem 5.5 In ZF1:
⊢ A ∨ ¬A,⊢ ¬¬A→ A,⊢ (A ∧ ¬∗A)→ B,0 (A ∧ ¬A)→ B,0 A→ ¬¬A,0
¬(A ∧ ¬A).
Theorem 5.6 If A is provable in ZF , then A∗ is probable in ZF1 (ZF is
included in ZF1).
Theorem 5.7 ZF is inconsistent if and only if ZF1 is non trivial.
ZF is, in a certain sense, contained in ZF1. So, in ZF1 it is possible to
systematize extant classical mathematics; in consequence, ZF1 encompasses
all mathematical analysis required for the treatment of standard quantum
mechanics, and this treatment is similar to the one with classical logic (and
set theory) as the basic logic.
In the study of a quantum system S in NF1, we note that its states
behave as in classical quantum mechanics, in the sense that
ZF1 0 ∃s(s ∈ Sˆ ∧ ¬
∗(s ∈ Sˆ)) (2)
and some other similar formulas are (apparently) not probable, where Sˆ is
the set of the states of S included in a given superposition.
When S is in the state of superposition of, say, the states s1 and s2
(classically inconsistent), we introduce in ZF1 the extra predicate K and
expand the system with the postulates
K(S, s1) and ¬K(S, s1) (3)
as well as:
K(S, s2) and ¬K(S, s2) (4)
Informally, for instance K(S1, s1) means that “S has the superposition
predicate associated to s1” (or the “paraconsistent predicate associated to
s1”). In other words, superposition creates a contradictory situation, giving
rise to contradictory relations. In ZF1, we can not directly assume that the
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linear combination of two classically incompatible states is an ‘inconsistent’
state; this is so because the mathematics of usual quantum mechanics is
classical, and such kind of inconsistency would make our system trivial.
To cope with this situation, we appeal to a new postulate:
Postulate of inconsistency. Let S be a quantum system which is in the
superposition of the (classically incompatible) states s1 and s2. Under the
hipothesys, we have:
K(S, s1) ∧ ¬K(S, s1) ∧K(S, s2) ∧ ¬K(S, s2) (5)
This means that superposition implies contradiction. Similarly when super-
position involves more than two states.
Therefore, ZF1 constitutes the underlaying logic of an inconsistent, but
apparently non trivial, quantum mechanics that we denote by QM1; usual
quantum mechanics will be denoted by QM . Thus, QM is in a certain sense,
contained in QM1. But the details of the construction of a paraconsistent
quantum mechanics will be left to a future series of technical works.
6 Discussion: Considering Contradiction “Right
from the Start”
Our proposal focuses on the idea that it would be worthwhile to develop a
new interpretation of quantum superpositions which considers contradiction
“right from the start”. We have provided an outline of a paraconsistent
approach to quantum superpositions which shows the possibility to consider
contradictions also from a formal perspective. However, it should be clear
that we do not take paraconsistent logic to be the “true logic” which should
replace classical logic; in the same way as we do not regard quantum me-
chanics as a theory that should replace classical mechanics [4, 30]. From
our perspective we argue that physicists should recognize the possibility to
use new forms of logic —such as paraconsistent logic— which might help us
understanding features of different domains of reality; features which might
not be necessarily accommodated by means of classical logic. We do not
believe there is a “true logic”, but rather that distinct logical systems can
be of use to develop and understand complementary aspects of reality. Re-
calling the words of Albert Einstein: “It is only the theory which can tell
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you what can be observed”5 it could be argued that only within a theory it
is possible to consider and account for phenomena. From this standpoint the
development of the formalism can be regarded not only as a merely technical
improvement, but also as a way to open new paths of understanding and
even of development of new phenomena. Formal development is not under-
stood here as going beyond the theory, as improving and showing something
that “was not there before” in the formalism —as it is the case of the GRW
theory or Bohmian mechanics. Rather, this development is understood as
taking seriously the features which the theory seems to show us, exposing
them in all their strength, “right from the start”.
We also have to stress that non relativistic quantum mechanics, based
on classical logic and on the common specific postulates, seems to be con-
sistent in the strict logical meaning. So, a paraconsistent version of it has to
postulate, in some way or other, the inconsistent character of determinable
situations. It appears to be that there is no possibility that someone can
“deduce”, employing any one of a majority of extant logics, contradictory
consequences of the specific axioms of non relativistic quantum mechanics.
Evidently, we have to develop and to explore the ideas here sketched.
One of the important points to take into consideration is that there are
numerous ways to obtain such kind of inconsistent quantum mechanics. In
addition, we should verify if there are really important new results of QM1
which are not valid in QM . The philosophical meaning of QM1 also deserves
detailed analysis.
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